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Abstract
This paper examines characteristics of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
(SPACs) as determinants of post-acquisition success. I collected data on all SPACs which
merged with a target firm between 2016 and the start of 2021. The data set controls for a
host of variables including the contractual design of the SPAC, management team
characteristics, founder compensation structure, key underwriter data, and performance
metrics measured throughout the SPAC’s lifecycle. Using a multivariable regression, I
find new and robust insights into the SPAC market. Contrary to current literature, I
conclude that the misaligned incentives caused by the initial at-risk capital supplied by
founders are overstated. Additionally, I find evidence that underwriter characteristics are
declining in importance as more institutional investors enter the SPAC market. Finally, I
find that redemption rates have a key significant effect on post-acquisition share price
growth.
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I. Introduction
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs, have experienced
tremendous growth over the past year, transitioning from a niche financial instrument
into the hottest commodity on Wall Street. Simply put, SPACs are blank check
companies which exist as an alternative to the traditional IPO process. They raise capital
through an IPO which is then used to merge with a private company, thereby taking it
public. Shareholders who do not approve of a proposed merger can choose to redeem
their shares in exchange for their full investment plus interest. If a SPAC fails to merge
with a target company within two years, it liquidates and returns capital to shareholders.
Once considered a “back-door” to public markets, the spotlight has suddenly been shone
on SPACs. Success stories of firms like Draft Kings (DKNG) providing shareholders
with impressive returns after going public via SPAC in 2020 created a favorable shift in
market sentiment, resulting in an extraordinary volume of new entrants into public
markets. As seen in Figure I.1, 2020 SPAC IPO proceeds were nearly double the entire
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Figure I.1 - SPAC IPO Data from 2013 to April 10th, 2021. Source: (SPAC Research)

seven preceding years combined. Only four months into 2021, SPAC IPO proceeds have
already surpassed those record setting figures and outpaced traditional IPOs by a wide
margin.
Despite the media hype, research on the determinants of post-acquisition
performance remains sparse. Unlike traditional firms, SPACs do not have operations or a
business model which can be used to predict success. Instead, a SPAC’s only assets are the
human capital of its management team and the capital raised through the IPO. Investors
are therefore faced with high levels of uncertainty when projecting the prospects of a
SPAC. Cummings (2014) compared this process to “betting on a jockey.” This paper
attempts to reduce the uncertainty by examining success factors of post-acquisition SPACs
using a host of variables regressed against post-acquisition share price growth.
Past research has criticized SPACs for their structure which creates misaligned
incentives and substantial costs (Klausner, 2020); however, an empirical study focused on
post-acquisition performance has not been undertaken. The lack of research combined with
the continued flood of SPACs into public equity markets makes it increasingly important
to analyze the structure, history, and drivers behind SPAC success. While my study
provided many insights, three standout: first, contrasting previous research on perverse
incentives, at-risk capital supplied by founders was shown to have a positive and significant
effect on share price growth; second, there is new evidence suggesting that characteristics
of SPAC underwriters are declining in importance as more underwriters enter the SPAC
market; finally, share redemption rates were found to be highly variable across the SPAC
sample and had a negative, significant effect on post-merger SPAC performance. In my
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thesis, I will first provide insight into the structure and history of the blank check firms. I
will then discuss the existing literature before showcasing my methodology and results.

II. SPAC Background
II.1 SPAC Structure
At their core, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies are an investment vehicle
which provide private firms an alternative route to public markets. Founders, or sponsors,
pool capital together for the sole purpose of taking a private firm public. At this point, they
have no business operations and do not have an acquisition target. The SPAC then raises
additional capital from institutional investors through an IPO. Typically, 85% to 100% of
IPO proceeds enter a trust which can only be used for an acquisition (Jenkinson and Sousa,
2009). During the SPAC’s life, the trust earns interest by investing in short term US
government securities. The remaining IPO proceeds and startup capital from founders are
used to cover the underwriter fees, IPO expenses, and working capital.
Instead of receiving a salary, SPAC founders are compensated with a significant
equity stake purchased at a nominal price prior to the IPO. This block of shares is
commonly called the “promote” and typically equates to 25% of IPO proceeds or 20% of
shares outstanding. These shares are placed into an escrow account and are subject to
transfer restrictions and anti-dilution mechanisms. Restrictions often include a lock-up
period of up to one year after the business combination with exceptions if shares break a
specified price threshold.
The SPAC founders have a two-year window after the IPO to complete an
acquisition. If this deadline is not met, the trust account is liquidated and returned to public
7

shareholders. Assuming a firm is identified, an announcement is made and shareholders
vote to approve the deal. If shareholders do not approve of the acquisition, they can redeem
their shares in exchange for their initial investment plus interest. Founders, however, are
unable to participate in any liquidation meaning that they end up with nothing if they fail
to complete a deal. Oftentimes, liquidated shares are replaced through a private investment
in public equity, or PIPE, to ensure a deal is completed. Once a deal is completed, SPAC
shares are converted into shares of the new combined firm. Figure II.1 illustrates the SPAC
lifecycle.

Figure II.1 - The SPAC Lifecycle

II.2 History
SPACs have only recently entered the mainstream, but the earliest iteration in the
United States can be traced back to 1993. Following the 1987 stock market crash, the SEC
implemented Rule 419 which was designed to give additional protection to public investors
8

from blank-check penny stock companies. SPACs soon followed to circumvent the new
restrictions put in place. Since SPACs operated outside of the SEC’s new regulation,
Murray (2017) argues that they have been able to undergo change and evolution more
swiftly, leading to an investment vehicle that can quickly adapt to volatile market
conditions. Recent changes include removing share redemption thresholds and allowing
for share trading after the merger vote, which essentially provides investors with 100%
downside protection. These changes have played a vital role in making SPACs an attractive
option for both founders and institutional investors. In the following section, I discuss the
SPAC literature and theory which shaped my empirical model.

III. Literature Review
III.1 SPAC Sponsor Incentives
A criticism consistently leveled against SPACs is the misaligned sponsor incentives
influenced by the current deal structuring. As mentioned in the previous section, founders
are compensated with the promote which typically equates to 20% of the outstanding
shares. This has made SPAC management a highly lucrative and attractive position. In a
2007 study performed by Jog and Son, the median return for the founders of a successfully
merged SPAC equated to 1,900%. If a merger does not occur, however, the SPAC is
liquidated, and the founders lose their entire investment. Therefore, SPAC sponsors are
heavily incentivized to complete a deal regardless of the underlying quality of the target
firm (Jog and Son 2007). Later studies by Berger (2008) and Jenkinson et al (2011)
solidified the validity of Jog & Son’s findings. These incentive issues are thought to be
made worse by the start-up capital supplied by founders. This investment is devoid of
9

redemption rights and is therefore referred to as “at-risk”. Klausner (2020) argues that
higher levels of at-risk capital will widen the gap between founder and shareholder
motivations.
In addition to being the root of unbalanced incentives, the promote paid to sponsors
causes significant share dilution and decreases shareholder value. In effect, the promote
acts as a tax on a SPAC’s merger. Klausner (2020) concluded that, of the SPACs which
successfully merged between 2019-2020, the median net promote as a percentage of postmerger equity was 7.7%. In order for the acquisition to be a value increasing transaction,
the merger must generate a surplus greater than the inherent dilution within the SPAC’s
structure.

III.2 The Role of Institutional Investors and Share Redemptions
SPACs have been described by some as a poor man's private equity, allowing
average retail investors an opportunity to bet on a sponsors’ skills in identifying and
merging with a high potential private firm. From this perspective, SPACs can be viewed
as a democratizing force within financial markets. Klausner (2020), however, argued that
the role of institutional investors is often understated. In his study based on the 46 SPACs
which merged from January 1st, 2019 to June 30th, 2020, he revealed that the median
ownership by 13F filers during this period is 87% of pre-merger SPAC shares. It can be
inferred from this figure that SPACs have not given the average retail investor a seat at the
table.
Given that institutional investors hold most of the pre-merger shares, it is important
to understand how these firms view their positions. One may be inclined to believe that
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institutional investors trust in the ability of the sponsors and plan to hold onto their shares
through the merger. Of the 2019-20 cohort of merged SPACs researched by Klausner
(2020), however, the mean redemption rate equated to 58%. Despite these high rates of
redemption, mergers were still completed due to growth of PIPE financing available to
SPACs. In this sample, 77% of SPACs raised additional capital at the time of their mergers.
After share redemptions, there is an average of 42% of the original shares
outstanding. At first glance, these unredeemed shares appear to be instances where
investors expressed confidence in the proposed deal and held onto their shares. Klausner
(2020) attempted to investigate this by analyzing the divestment rate of 13F shareholders.
Divestment can be considered either a redemption or sale of shares starting from the merger
announcement until just before the merger closes. From their analysis, it was discovered
that the mean SPAC divestment rate stood at 90% for SPACs merged in 2019, indicating
that IPO investors choose to redeem or divest their shares regardless of the target
companies’ outlook. Therefore, a high rate of redemption seems to be an industry standard
rather than a predictor of a target companies’ future success. Questions remain about the
long-term validity of these insights and their impact on post-acquisition performance.
Klausner’s study only observed SPACs which merged in 2019. By observing a longer
period, I seek to gain a better understanding of the impact that institutional investors and
share redemptions have on SPAC mergers.

III.3 Characteristics of SPAC Success
Research on the underlying drivers of a successful SPAC is quite sparse, however,
Cumming’s (2014) study successfully laid out an economic model and methodology to
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investigate. It applied a logit model to comprehensively analyze the success factors for
their dependent variable: acquisition approval. Their sample consisted of all completed
SPACs listed on U.S. stock exchanges between 2003 and 2010. This sample included 163
SPACs, ninety-eight of which successfully completed an acquisition. The study utilized
twenty-three explanatory variables combined into four separate sections: SPAC Structure,
IPO Process, Ownership Structure, and Operations and Performance. Interestingly, the data
indicates that more experienced managers and boards do not enhance the probability of
deal approval. Additionally, it was found that more prestigious underwriters and large
underwriter syndicates adversely affect the chances of an acquisition target being approved
(Cummings et al, 2014).
Cumming’s research was foundational in understanding the drivers behind SPAC
acquisition approval. To be applicable in 2020, however, the methodology must be updated
to encompass the drastic variations that the SPAC market has undergone. For instance,
acquisition approval is no longer a valid metric for success given the drastic decline in
liquidation rates caused by the growth of PIPE investments and the removal of redemption
thresholds. Cumming’s sample had a liquidation rate of 40% in comparison to a 2%
liquidation rate in 2019. Additionally, investors looking to hold their shares through a
SPAC merger will be unable to derive insights from Cumming’s research. In this paper, I
shift my attention towards post-merger stock performance to understand how SPAC
success factors impact shareholder value.
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IV. Methodology
IV.1 Data
The purpose of my research is to understand success factors determining positive
returns following a SPAC acquisition. To do so, I analyze share price growth over a
specified trading period. Murray (2017) argues that SPACs have been continuously
evolving and adapting to changing market conditions. This suggests that newer SPACs will
provide more relevant results. Additionally, SPAC acquisitions showed steady growth
starting in 2016 prior to the SPAC boom witnessed in 2020, indicating a favorable swing
in market sentiment toward SPACs as a method of reaching public markets. To capture the
latest trends in SPACs, I have focused my study on SPACs which completed a deal after
January 1st, 2016. My primary sample measures share price growth over a 365-day trading
window. SPACs which closed a deal after January 1st, 2016 and prior to April 30th, 2020
were eligible for the sample. To capture price movement as the deal approaches
completion, I chose to begin the trading window 30-days prior to the acquisition date.
I utilized the investment database “SPAC Research” to identify all relevant
offerings. Results were then confirmed through the investment database “SPAC Track”
and the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. There was a
total of ninety-one SPACs who completed their life cycle as blank check companies and
either liquidated or acquired a company during this time frame. Eleven SPACs failed to
combine with a target firm and have thus been excluded from the dataset, leaving eighty
SPACs who successfully completed their acquisition. A further five SPACs have been
excluded from the sample. The first successfully combined with a target company;
13

however, the firm waived the closing conditions under the merger agreement which would
have required common stocks and warrants to be listed on the NASDAQ. The second was
the subject of an additional acquisition nine months after its initial combination. The final
three were delisted during the 365-day trading window leaving a sample of 75 SPACs. To
ensure my results are robust and valid, I also created samples which measured share price
growth over a 180-day and 90-day trading period. This reduced trading window allowed
me to include additional SPACs to the sample from the latter stages of 2020 and the start
of 2021. The 180-day and 90-day samples contains 101 and 130 total SPACs, respectively.
Table IV.1 provides a breakdown of SPACs included in each sample by year. For all three
samples, I collected data across three different types: structural SPAC data, IPO process
data, and performance data. The following section provides detail on the sources and
insights that can be derived from the data. Table IV.2 identifies the variables and their
respective definitions.

Table IV.1 – SPACs Included in Each Sample by Year

Source: (SPAC Research and SEC EDGAR)
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Table IV.2 – Variable Definitions

IV.1.1 Structural SPAC Data
Structural SPAC data includes the contractual design of the offering, leadership
information, and incentive structure. Most of this information was compiled through the
investing databases “SPAC Research” and “SPAC Track” alongside audited filings from
SEC EDGAR. All SPACS are required to submit form 424 to the SEC in accordance with
the Securities Act of 1933 (Heyman 2007). I leveraged these public filings to obtain reliable
information on key components of my SPACs of interest to be used in my analysis.
Primarily, these filings were used to gather data on SPAC managers. All managers listed
within form 424 were included in the total managers variable and their ages were averaged
to create the team age variable. In this study, average team age is used as a proxy for
experience.
15

In addition to pulling data from SEC filings, the vetted forms allowed me to validate
information from my investing databases. Trust value, IPO units, at-risk capital, and
promote shares were exported from the archived database and at-risk capital database
found on SPAC Research. The trust value variable measures the total IPO proceeds placed
into the escrow account after the IPO in millions of dollars. The IPO shares variable
measures the total public shares outstanding directly after the IPO. At-risk capital measures
the initial funds provided by the founders in millions of dollars. If the SPAC were to fail
to make a business combination, the at-risk capital would not be returned to the founders
as it is devoid of redemption rights. The promote shares variable measures the total shares
awarded to founders after the business combination is completed. I divided the promote
shares by the total IPO shares to normalize the data across all SPACs. This variable is used
to understand the underlying incentive issues derived from the compensation structure for
sponsors. For variables not easily exportable, I created a web scraper which was able to
automate the data pulling process and eliminate manual errors. Finally, to obtain the
expertise dummy variable, I manually cross-referenced manager names from form 424
with the “SPAC Research” directors database. 1 is used to denote SPACs with a manager
who had successfully completed two or more business combinations in their history and 0
otherwise. This dummy variable is used as a proxy for management’s expertise and
understanding of the SPAC industry.
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Tables IV.3 and IV.4 contain structural data statistics for the one-year and 90-day
samples respectively. The 90-day sample allowed for an additional 55 observations from
the latter stages of 2020 and the start of 2021 and will thus provide insight into how SPACs
have continued to develop when compared to the 365-day sample. Trust value in the 365day sample has a mean value of $265 million and a standard deviation of $198.09 million
indicating that SPACs continue to be highly differentiated in size. Despite promote shares
being negotiable, the promote to IPO shares ratio has a standard deviation of 0.02
indicating that SPAC founders have historically received relatively uniform payouts across
all SPACs. This lack of variance may minimize the insights into the misaligned incentives
caused by the promote.

Table IV.3 – Structural SPAC Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample

Table IV.4 – Structural SPAC Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample
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Trust value, number of managers, experience, expertise, and at-risk capital all had
relatively small increases after including the additional observations from the 90-day
sample (+1.5%, +0.2%, +0.1%, +3.3%, and +1.0% respectively). The promote to IPO
shares ratio, however, declined by -1.0%. The lack of significant change between the two
samples indicates that as SPAC boom continued through 2020, little evolution occurred in
SPAC structure.

IV.1.2 IPO Process Data
IPO process data provides essential descriptive statistics on the SPAC IPO backers.
This data was scraped from SPAC Research through a channel of archival data on historic
SPAC underwriters. This dataset is given by annual panel data which I then aligned with
my structural SPAC data by year and underwriter. I was able to obtain data on the ranking
of underwriters based on total bookrunner volume as well as the total number of
underwriters backing a given SPAC. Examining the groups underwriting these SPACs will
allow my model to make predictions about how SPACs will perform based upon the total
volume in millions of dollars underwritten by the backer. Of particular interest in my
analysis is the phenomenon of “serial underwriting”, a case where one backer is behind an
extremely high volume of SPACs. By analyzing this group compared with low volume
backers, I can develop insights into underwriter incentives. We might expect that serial
underwriters back SPACs for the underwriting commission and fees associated with the
IPO rather than their expectations about company potential. Tables IV.5 and IV.6 contain
IPO process data summary statistics for the 365-day and 90-day samples.
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Table IV.5 – IPO Process Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample

Table IV.6 – IPO Process Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample

IV.1.3 Performance Data
Performance data includes variables which fluctuate during the SPAC’s lifecycle
and can be used as a benchmark for manager performance. Primarily, this data was scraped
from the archival database found on SPAC Research. The days searching variable was
calculated by finding the difference between the IPO date and the date the deal was
finalized. This variable allows for an analysis of SPAC managers ability to find a target
company quickly and close the deal. I expect that post acquisition performance will fall as
days searching approaches the two-year liquidation deadline. To not lose out on the
promote, managers will be motivated to push through a deal regardless of the quality of the
target firm. Redemption rate measures the percent of shares redeemed for cash from the
trust value throughout the SPAC’s lifecycle. Despite Klausner’s (2020) argument that
public investors divest their shares regardless of the potential outlook of the target firm, I
expect that redemption rate should give a measure of the shareholder’s trust in
19

management. The implied pro forma enterprise value is calculated at the time of deal close
and pulled from the 8-K merger announcement. This value was then divided by trust value
to normalize across all observations. Principally, this variable will allow for an analysis of
management’s ability to find a favorable deal for shareholders. I expect there will be a
positive effect on post-acquisition performance the more enterprise value outweighs trust
value.
For my dependent variable, I have chosen to analyze the growth rate of share price.
Studies in the past have largely focused their attention on the acquisition itself, however,
this provides little insight for investors looking for long term returns on their SPAC
investment. Using a price growth rate provides a more powerful indicator of a SPAC’s
success in current analysis, because it can directly chart a firm’s performance on public
markets. To calculate this value, I pulled daily share price data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) across my periods of interest for all SPACs included
in my sample. I used the following equation to calculate share growth:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = ln (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1 ) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖
0

Tables IV.7 and IV.8 contain performance data summary statistics for the 365-day
and 90-day samples respectively. The 365-day price growth rate has a mean value of -32%
which is far below the S&P 500’s growth which had a CAGR of 12.9% between 2016 and
2020 (FRED). This clearly reflects the risky nature of SPACs and should be used to caution
investors trying to capitalize on the media hype. It is important to note, however, that SPAC
performance has shown strong improvement. The 13 SPACs included in the 365-day
sample which closed a deal in 2020 had a mean growth rate of 6.1%, highlighting the
20

continued validation of SPACs as a method of reaching public markets. Interestingly, the
90-day sample’s share price growth has a mean value of -6% up +26 percentage points
from the 365-day sample. This indicates that public equity markets have historically
overvalued SPACs shortly after the deal is completed.
Table IV.7 – Performance Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample

Table IV.8 – Performance Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample

The enterprise value to trust value ratio has a mean of 412%, highlighting the
importance of PIPE financing to meet liquidity requirements. As Klausner (2020)
showcased, 77% of SPACs received a capital infusion through PIPE financing or an
additional investment from founders during their lifecycle. This additional capital provides
management vital flexibility during the acquisition phase. The days spent searching for an
acquisition had a mean value of 602.28 days which satisfies the two-year liquidation
deadline. A considerable portion of the SPACs included in the sample, however, extended
far beyond the deadline. In these cases, shareholders voted to extend the SPAC’s charter
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allowing it to bypass the liquidation requirements. Redemption rates in the 365-day sample
had a mean value of 55% which is consistent with Klausner’s (2020) study. After including
the additional firms from the 90-day sample, the mean falls by 10 percentage points. This
indicates the growing trust in SPACs from investors as more choose to hold their shares
throughout the entire SPAC lifecycle. Figure IV.8 shows redemption rates broken down by
year.

Figure IV.8 – Average Redemption rates from 2017 through January 2021
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IV.2 Model
To determine whether there is a significant linear relationship between share price
growth and the covariates listed above, I ran a multiple variable regression. For each
variable, I observe characteristics associated with SPAC “i” in year “t”. Prior to running
the regression, I transformed several variables to find the model with best fit. First, I
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performed a log transformation on At-Risk Capital to improve linearity between the
dependent and independent variables such that:
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 = ln(𝐴𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 ) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶 𝑖
Additionally, I created dummy variables using the number of managers, average team age,
number of underwriters, and days searching variables such that:
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 ≤ 7
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 > 7
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {

0 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 ≤ 53.6
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 > 53.6

𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 ≤ 2
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 > 2

0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 ≤ 730
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 > 730
I chose seven directors as the Large Board Dummy variable cutoff and 53.6 as the
Experienced Dummy variable cutoff as they were the median values. Two was chosen as
the Crowded Underwriter Dummy cutoff because it logically allows for one lead
underwriter who takes on the most prominent role and a secondary underwriter with less
responsibility and less of the share of the profits. Finally, 730 days was chosen as the cutoff
point for the Days Searching Dummy as it naturally splits SPACs who completed their deal
within the two-year liquidation deadline and those who were forced to extend. To control
for the time difference fixed effect, I include a year dummy variable for each year and omit
2016. Running the regression with the four specified dummy variables above results in an
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R2 0.399 for the one-year sample and was thus chosen as the best fit. The adjusted R2 of
0.2332 is comparable to Kolb’s (2016) SPAC model which had an adjusted R2 of 0.19.

V. Results
Table V.1 outlines the regression results for all three samples. The one-year sample
best represented the data, recording an R-squared of .399. Therefore, interpretations of the
results are based on the one-year sample with consideration given to the significance and
sign of the 180-day and 90-day samples. In the following section, I interpret the results
across the three categories: structural SPAC data, IPO process data, and performance data.
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Table V.1 - Regression Results

V.1 Structural SPAC Data
Trust Value is the net IPO proceeds transferred to the SPAC escrow account. This
sum along with accrued interest is either used for an acquisition or paid back to investors
if the shares are redeemed or in the event of a liquidation. Cummings (2014) argues that
given a higher trust value, the value proposition of any acquisition proposal must be even
more attractive because the opportunity costs of redeeming shares increases. This implies
that shareholders demand a higher return on investment in cases where trust value is high.
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Surprisingly, trust value has a significant and negative effect on post-SPAC share price
performance for both the one-year and 90-day samples. For a one standard deviation
increase in trust value, there is an expected 0.44 standard deviation decrease in share price
growth. This reflects Roll’s (1964) argument that smaller firms yield larger average returns
even after adjusting for risk. Given that trust value is a large determinant of potential target
company size, it can be inferred that a larger trust value will have a negative effect on
returns.
As stated previously, SPACs have no operations or business model that investors
can evaluate to predict success. Instead, investors base their decisions upon the
characteristics of the management teams (Cummings 2014). Interestingly, the large board
dummy variable produced a negative and insignificant sign across all samples. Yermack
(1996) argues that firms with smaller boards of directors have higher market valuations as
large boards may struggle with effective communication and decision-making. The
insignificant sign for the large board variable can be attributed to the immense structural
differences between SPACs and large corporations. The lack of operational responsibilities
allows for a far less complex environment where breakdowns in communication can be
mitigated.
Similarly, the experienced variable returned a positive and insignificant sign.
Experience and institutional knowledge are likely essential to navigate the SPAC market
and acquire a successful target company; however, Cumming (2014) argues that younger
managers have not yet achieved comparable wealth to older managers and will thus be
more motivated to close a deal. These two contrasting effects may explain the lack of

26

significance. While the experience variable was shown to be insignificant, the expertise
variable returned a positive and significant sign for both the one-year and 180-day samples.
If a member of a SPAC’s management team has completed one or more SPAC acquisitions,
there is a resulting 34.9% increase above average returns. The SPAC market is nuanced
and constantly changing. Having firsthand experience navigating the SPAC lifecycle is
shown to be instrumental in finding and identifying successful target companies.
As stated in the literature review, there has been significant research dedicated to
the misaligned incentives and dilution caused by the sponsor promote, implying a negative
impact on post-acquisition share price performance (Klausner 2020). Receiving the
promote shares is contingent on founders successfully completing a deal. This causes
severe incentive issues, wherein the sponsor is motivated to complete an acquisition prior
to the expiration date regardless of the quality of the target firm. Interestingly, the promote
to IPO shares ratio returned a positive and insignificant sign. The lack of significance can
likely be explained by the uniformity within the sample. The mean value of promote shares
to total shares outstanding is 20.3% with only a 1.4% standard deviation in the one-year
sample. Founders are awarded proportionally similar compensation across most of the
SPAC population. Therefore, the SPACs within the sample are similarly impacted by the
sponsor promote, causing it to be insignificant.
While the promote was shown to be insignificant, at-risk capital returned a positive
and significant sign for all three samples. A 10% increase in at-risk capital results in a 6.2%
rise in post-acquisition returns. SPAC founders are heavily incentivized to complete a deal
prior to their liquidation date due to the enormous payoff that can be achieved through the
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promote (Jog and Son 2007). These incentives grow even stronger when considering the
initial at-risk capital supplied by founders to cover overhead and IPO costs (Klausner
2020). Unlike other shares which can be redeemed from the trust value, at-risk capital is
void of redemption rights and cannot be recouped in the event of a liquidation. More capital
from founders should exacerbate the misaligned incentives between founders and public
shareholders. On the other hand, at-risk capital is exchanged for shares and warrants of the
SPAC and will thus force additional “skin-in the game” for founders. Founder payoff
becomes increasingly tied to post-acquisition performance as pools of at-risk capital grow
larger, explaining the positive and significant coefficient.

V.2 IPO Process Data
The crowded underwriter dummy variable returns a negative and significant
coefficient for the one-year sample. Wilson (1968) proposes the idea that syndicates are
formed in cases where risk-sharing is needed. Instead of taking on the entire risk for a
particular SPAC, IPO investors choose to share it and split the subsequent payoff or losses.
Therefore, an increase in underwriters can be viewed as a lack of trust in SPAC
management from 13F filers. Additionally, SPAC management must balance challenges
derived from communicating with multiple stakeholders with differing risk tolerances.
This can slow efficiency and cause decision making problems. If a SPAC is underwritten
by three or more institutions, it results in a decline of 41% from the average return.
The highest ranked underwriter variable returns a positive and significant
coefficient for the one-year sample. Intuitively, underwriters with a higher bookrunner
volume are more experienced and knowledgeable of the SPAC market. Additional
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expertise from underwriters is proven to be valuable during the searching and acquisition
phase of a SPAC’s lifecycle. For one increase in rank for a SPAC’s highest ranked
underwriter, there is an expected 6.6% increase in returns. Surprisingly, average
underwriter ranking results in a negative and significant coefficient for the one-year and
180-day samples. Each increase in rank results in an expected 6.6% increase in returns. It
appears that SPACs benefits from having a disparity in underwriter ranking. Having a clear
underwriting authority may mitigate the negative effects caused by having a crowded
underwriting table.
It is important to note that the crowded dummy, highest ranked underwriter, and
average underwriter rank covariates all returned significant signs for the one-year sample;
however, they all proved insignificant in the 90-day regression. This is likely due to the
additional observations added to the sample from the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021.
By extending the sample period, the 90-day regression can more closely capture the effect
of the explosion in SPAC popularity seen in 2020. As a byproduct of the growth of SPACs,
a wave of institutional investors entered the SPAC market for the first time. In 2020, there
was a total of 41 active underwriters up 42% from 2019. This growth of institutional
investors reflects the continued legitimization of special purpose acquisition companies
and can explain the decreased need for risk sharing amongst underwriters. Additionally,
increased competition amongst underwriters and the subsequent increase in optionality for
SPAC founders likely mitigated the effects of specific underwriter characteristics.
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V.3 Performance Data

The enterprise value to trust value interaction term is shown to have a positive and
significant sign with a 10-percentage point increase resulting in an expected 0.63% increase
in share price. These results can be interpreted in several different ways. First, it can be
inferred that the ratio between enterprise value and trust value showcases management’s
ability to strike a favorable deal for shareholders. It also provides further insight into the
effect of capital infusions during the SPAC lifecycle. In cases where trust values fall below
the required level of cash to complete a deal, SPACs have relied heavily on PIPE
investments to replenish redeemed capital and finalize mergers. These findings
demonstrate that PIPE financing affords management the flexibility to find and negotiate
more promising deals for shareholders.
Redemption Rate returned a negative and statistically significant sign for all three
regressions, contradicting past research. Klausner (2020) argued that institutional
investors, who hold most of the public shares throughout a given SPACs life, are motivated
to divest their shares regardless of the potential quality of the target firm, minimizing the
insights derived from share redemptions. The data, however, shows that share redemptions
provide clear insight into post acquisition performance. Klausner focused his research on
SPACs which merged from 2019 through mid-2020 cohort, but significant changes have
been made since that point in time. As stated in the data section, average redemption rate
has fallen considerably since its high in 2018. This highlights the legitimization of the
SPAC market and shows that institutional investors are more willing to trust in the SPAC
process.
30

The Days Searching Dummy coefficient proved to be statistically insignificant and
positive. As Jog and Son (2007) argued and later research confirmed, SPAC founders are
heavily incentivized to complete a deal prior to the liquidation date regardless of the quality
of the target firm. As time passes in theory, pressure to acquire a firm quickly continues to
mount for management. If a SPAC is unable to find a suitable acquisition target earlier in
its lifecycle, it becomes increasing unlikely that one will surface as the deadline looms
closer. Therefore, SPAC managers approaching the liquidation date should be incentivized
to push through riskier and less profitable acquisitions. Interestingly, the data does not
support this theory. The ability to circumvent the liquidation deadline by holding a
shareholder vote appears to mitigate the misaligned incentives derived from the SPAC
compensation structure.

VI. Conclusion
This paper attempts to identify key SPAC characteristics that translate to postacquisition share price growth. The data I employ includes structural data, IPO process
data, and key performance metrics measured throughout the SPAC’s life. My study on the
determinants of post-acquisition success provides new and robust results which can be
employed by investors evaluating the SPAC market and for future studies.
First, this paper reveals new findings on founder compensation, contradicting past
research. As discussed in the results section, at-risk capital was found to have a positive
and significant effect on share price growth in all three regressions despite the introduction
of potentially misaligned incentives. While there may still be concerns about founders
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promoting risky acquisitions to avoid losing their investment, additional at-risk capital
increases the tie between founder compensation and post-acquisition performance.
Applying this finding, shareholders should view high levels of at-risk capital as an indicator
of founder commitment.
Second, I find evidence that underwriter characteristics are declining in importance
as a determinant for post-acquisition success. All three underwriter variables proved to be
significant in the one-year regression but were insignificant in the 90-day sample which
extends through January of 2021. The lack of significance in the 90-day sample reflects
rapidly changing market sentiments throughout 2020 which saw a wave of institutional
investors entering the SPAC market for the first time. SPAC founders now have
unprecedented optionality on who they plan to work with, and the results suggest that there
is no clear underwriter archetype which provides the strongest results. Therefore,
shareholders should not place excessive weight upon underwriter characteristics when
making investment decisions.
Third, share redemption rates are shown to have a key significant effect on postacquisition share price growth for all three regressions. This result was to be expected but
was not certain given the high redemption rates seen across the majority of the SPAC
population. Additionally, Klausner’s (2020) argument suggested that most shareholders are
incentivized to divest their shares regardless of the quality of the target firm. My data,
however, confirms the significant association between share redemptions and share price
growth which can be applied by investors observing the SPAC market.

32

This study was undertaken during a period of enormous growth and change for the
SPAC market, leaving significant room for future studies to build from as the SPAC market
continues to mature. Most notably, exploring the effect of the sponsor promote on share
price growth several years from now has the potential for robust and new findings. As
mentioned previously, the sponsor promote was largely uniform across the entire
population, resulting in a positive and insignificant effect in my regression. This is likely
to change, as SPACs continue to saturate the market and compete over the highest potential
firms. Successful SPACs will likely reduce the amount of promote shares awarded to
founders in exchange for higher potential returns post-acquisition. Some SPAC founders
have shown a willingness to adopt this strategy. Hedge fund billionaire, William Ackman,
founded Pershing Square Tontine Holdings (PSTH) and raised capital through an IPO in
July of 2020. Ackman decided to abandon the industry standard and completely removed
the promote from the SPAC structure. As more founders are forced to follow Ackman’s
lead, empirical analysis on the effect of the sponsor promote could be eye-opening.
The SPAC has dominated headlines throughout 2020 and through the start of 2021;
however, a consensus between commentators is seemingly out of reach. Some argue that
the SPAC boom is a bubble that is sure to come crashing down while others claim SPACs
will never relinquish their crown back to the traditional IPO. Serious question marks
remain about their long-term prospects, but it does not appear like there is an end in sight
to this new era of SPACs. SPACs have seemingly become entrenched in public equity
markets and it is increasingly important for investors to educate themselves. By following
and understanding the above results, investors will maximize their preparedness for
determining which SPACs have the best chance of identifying a profitable target firm.
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